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1. Residential Construction Expenditures, 1889—1950
Gross Capital Formation
As has long been known, FOSS capital formation in residential
construction has been subject to long swings of great amplitude,
usually lasting for more than a decade to more than two decades.1
Between the beginning of the last decade of the nineteenth century
and 1950, three long cycles have been traced out in gross capital
formation (or four, if the submerged peak in 1941 is considered to
break the last cycle into two distinct cycles).2 An annual series of
Note: This paper presents new estimates of gross and net residential
capital formation and discusses some problems of methodology and in-
terpretation.It is an outgrowth of a forthcoming monograph, Capital For.
motion in Residential Real Estate: Trends andProspects(Princeton Uni-
versity Press for National Bureau of Economic Research), by Leo Grebler
and the authors of the present paper, staff members of the Institute for
Urban Land Use and Housing Studies.The monograph is a joint product
of the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Institute.
The present paper summarizes certain empirical findings of the mono-
graph but makes no attempt to analyze the causal factors underlying the
level and movement of capital formation in residential real estate. A com-
prehensive analysis of such factors, an exposition of the role of capital
funds in financing residential capital formation, and a general discussion
ofthe weaknesses and qualifications of the data will be found in the
larger study.
Unless otherwise stated, all data presented.in this paper are taken from
the monograph, and sources and methods of derivationdescribed there.
1Gross capital formation is here defined to include expenditures for new
private permanent nonf arm housekeeping dwelling units and for additions
to and alterations of such units.
2The choice of 1950 as a tentative terminal peak was based on two con-
siderations: first the number of dwelling units started in 1951 and 1952
was about a quarter below the 1950 high; second, it seems unflkely that
the 1950 high will be reached again in the near future.This view is base&
largely on the declining number of young people who will reach marriage-
able age during the next half decade and the resulting effect on the rate of
family formation, as well as the great decrease in the percentage of
doubled-up families since the end of World War II.
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Gross Capital Formation in Housekeeping Residential Real Estate,
Annual Data and Decade Averages, 1889—1950
(millions of dollars)
Current 1929 Current 1929
Year Dollars Dollars Year Dollars Dollars
1889 891 2,284 1920 1,212 1,021
1921 1,980 2,076
1890 875 2,232 1922 3,155 3,597
1891 694 1,831 1923 4,170 4,242
1892 843 2,290 1924 4,805 4,958
1893 662 1,804
1894 672 1,898 1925 5,160 5,364
1926 5,190 5,356
1895 756 2,167 1927 4,830 5,052
1896 683 1,945 1928 4,510 4,702
1897 719 2,090 1929 3,380 3,380
1898 646 1,800
1899 679 1,763 1930 1,875 1,923
1931 1,495 1,663
1900 503 1,239 1932 590 775
1901 683 1,703 1933 435 571
1902 648 1,561 1934 580 699
1903 691 1,607
1904 788 1,855 1935 960 1,193
1936 1,505 1,787
1905 1,264 2,840 1937 1,795 1,916
1906 1,281 2,620 1938 1,915 1,988
1907 1,148 2,246 1939 2,590 2,643
1908 1,148 2,319
1909 1,390 2,705 1940 2,895 2,846
1941 3,415 3,116
1910 1,140 2,143 1942 1,665 1,438
1911 1,109 2,113 1943 870 718
1912 1,221 2,270 1944 790 598
1913 1,214 2,339
1914 1,187 2,274 1945 1,060 752
1946 3,870 2,479
1915 1,300 2,430 1947 6,185 3,270
1916 1,371 2,406 1948 8,425 4,002
1917 879 1,320 1949 8,082 3,956
1918 481 608
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capitalformation in both current and constant dollars is pre-
sented in Table 1; turning points in this series are given in Table 2.
Decade averages for gross capital formation in current dollars
indicate a rising trend from decadedecade with the exception of
the 1930's (Table 1).However, the upward trend is much less
clearly marked in the decade averages of deflated capital formation.
The first three decades of the sixty-year period show little varia-
tion, but the level during the 1920-1929 decade was about double
that for the preceding periods.A major, decline was registered in
the 1930—1939 decade and a partial recovery in the 1940—1950
period.But the annual average deflated gross capital formation in
1940—1950 was still almost 34 per cent lower than that for the
1920's, although it was about a quarter above the level achieved
during the 1890—1919 period.
TABLE 2
Turning Points in Long Cycles in Gross Capital Formation













Five-year averages confirm the observation that the 1920's were
characterized by the greatest physical volume of residential con-
struction during the last six decades.Although average gross
capital formation in current dollars in 1946—1950 was more than
two-thirds higher than in 1925—1929 ($7.8 billion as against $4.6
billion), in constant dollars the post—World War II period was almost
one-fifth lower ($3.9 billion as against $4.8 billion).
In the analysis of series characterized by cycles with as long a
duration and as great an amplitude as those found in residential
construction, the use of long-cycle averages facilitates the study
of trend movements. Accordingly annual average gross capital for-
mation, in both current and constant dollars for the construction
cycles since 1889, is presented in Table 3. The cycle averages of
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TABLE 3
Annual Average Gross Capital Formation in Housekeeping








1889—1909 826 1892—1905 1,846
1909—1926 2,063 1905— 1925 2,465
1926—1950 3,022 1925—1950 2,495
1926—1941 2,244 1925—1941 2,546
1941—1950 4,319 1950—1950 2,406
current dollar gross capital formation show a continued rise over
the sixty-year period whether the 1926—1950 period is treated as a
single cycle or as two cycles. However, a very different movement
is found in the cycle averages for deflated gross capital formation.
The 1905—1925 cycle is characterized by a level of annual real
capital formation about a third higher than the 1892—1905 cycle.
Butthe1925—1950 period, whether treated as a single cycle or not,
showed very little change in real gross capital formation when com-
pared with the preceding cycle.
Components of Gross Capital Formation
Gross capital formation in housekeeping residential real estate
consists of expenditures for new housekeeping dwelling units and
for additions to and alterations of such units. Expenditures for new
units, of course, comprise the bulk of such capital formation, ac-
counting for about 90 per cent of capital formation over the period
1915—1950.But expenditures on additions and alterations appar-
ently play a not unimportant role in certain periods.
Expenditures for additions and alterations, although flue tuating
in rough concurrence with the residential building cycle, are much
more stable than expenditures for new dwelling units, and the ratio
between the two therefore moves countercyclically (Table 4).This
ratio declined from between 11 and 12 per cent in the half-decade
1915—1919, which included the World War I trough in residential
building, to slightly less than 7 per cent in the construction boom
of the 1920's.It rose to a peak of 23 or 24 per cent in the depres-
sion years of 1930—1934 and dropped steadily to 12 or 13 per cent
in the post—World War II boom.
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TABLE 4
Ratio of Expenditures for Additions and Alterations to Expenditures for



































Although the data in Table 4 cover less than two full construc-
tion cycles, they suggest a rising trend in additions and alterations
expenditures relative to expenditures on new housekeeping dwelling
units.The 1930—1950 ratio of the former to the latter was about
twice the ratio for the 1915—1919 period.The same conclusion re-
sults from a comparison at successive troughs and peaks. The ratio
in the trough half-decade 1915—1919 was about half the ratio in the
trough period 1930—1934.Similarly the ratios of expenditures for
additions and alterations to expenditures for new dwelling units in
the peak periods 1920—1924 and 1925—1929 were at about half the
level of the ratio in the postwar boom of 1945—1950This apparent
increasein the relative importance of additions and alterations
seems to be associated in part with a similar trend in conversions,
which are an important component of additions and alterations ex-
penditures.The increase is undoubtedly also associated with the
aging of the stock and with growth in the size of the stock relative
to new construction.
Net Capital Formation
In this field as elsewhere, net capital formation is computed by
subtracting capital consumption allowances from the estimates of
gross capital formation.3As a result of the increasing of the
3Capital consumption allowances for residential real estate are here
considered to he the sum of depreciation on existing residential structures
and the remaining value of demolished structures (see later sections of
this paper for details).
17TABLE 5
Net Capital Formation in Housekeeping Residential Real Estate1
Annual Data and Decade Averages, 1889—1950
(millions of dollars)
Current 1929 Current 1929
Year Dollars Dollars Year Dollars Dollars
1889 712 1,826 1920 —231 —195
1921 815 854
1890 681 1,736 1922 2,052 2,340
1891 493 1,301 1923 2,879 2,929
1892 636 1,727 1924 3,462 3,573
1893 444 1,210
1894 452 1,277 1925 3,749 3,897
1926 3,686 3,804
1895 529 1,515 1927 3,270 3,420
1896 444 1,264 1928 2,876 2,999
1897 474 1,379 1929 1,625 1,625
1898 381 1,063
1899 386 1,003 1930 207 212
1931 —46 —51
1900 186 459 1932 —706 —928
1901 364 908 1933 —847 —1,111
1902 310 748 1934 —797 —961
1903 335 778
1904 428 1,007 1935 —363 —451
1936 124 147
1905 872 1,960 1937 255 272
1906 831 1,700 1938 324 336
1907 661 1,293 1939 958 978
1908 662 1,337
1909 869 1,691 1940 1,162 1,143
1941 1,519 1,386
1910 581 1,093 1942 —353 —305
1911 545 1,040 1943 —1,225 —1,011
1912 631 1,172 1944 —1,464 —1,108
1913 631 1,216
1914 587 1,124 1945 —1,315 —933
1946 1,246 796
1915 671 1,255 1947 2,955 1,562
1916 686 1,204 1948 4,745 2,254
1917 69 103 1949 4,415 2,161
1918 —479 —605
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TABLE 6
Turning Points in Long Cycles in Net Capital Formation in















housingstock, capital consumption allowances have been gradually
rising over the last sixty years, with declines registered only in
those years in which net capital formation was negative.Subtrac-
tion of a series which shows a fairly smooth and siow increase over
time from one which exhibits fluctuations of great amplitude yields
a residual series with roughly coincident fluctuations of the same
absolute but greater relative magnitude.Thus the net capital for-
mation series (Tables 5 and 6) trace out the same long cycles that
were found in gross capital formation.
Decade averages of net capital formation in current and constant
dollars (Table 5) reveal substantial differences in movement from
the corresponding averages for gross capital formation.In current
dollars, the upward movement in gross capital formation during the
first three decades of the sixty-year period is almost wiped out in
the net capital formation series.In constant dollars, the relative
stability of the decade averages for gross capital formation during
the same thirty years is converted into a decline of substantial
magnitudein net capital formation.The decade of the 1920's
emerges as the period of greatest net additions in both current and
constant dollars.
Average annual net capital formation in 1940—1950 even in current
dollars was 24 per cent lower than in 1920—1929, while annual
average gross formation was 18 per cent higher. In constant
dollars, net capital formation in the 1940—1950 period was almost
two-thirds lower than in the 1920's, while gross capital formation
was only one-third lower.
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The same pattern emerges in an analysis of the 1925—1929 and
1946—1950periods,thetwo half-decades characterized by the
greatest residential construction volume in the entire span of sixty
years.In current dollars, annual average gross capital formation
was more than two-thirds higher in 1946—1950 than 1925—1929,
but average net capital formation was only 43 per cent higher.In
constant dollars, gross capital formation in 1946—1950 was almost
one-fifth lower than in 1925—1929.But net capital formation was
almost one-third lower.
As indicated in Table 5, net capital formation in both current and
constant dollars was negative in the 1930—1939 decade. There were
actually three periods of net disinvestment in housekeeping resi-
dential real estate in the last sixty years. The first and last were
associated with the two World Wars, while the second coincided
with the Great Depression of the 1930's (Table 5).Net disinvest-
ment in 1918 and 1920 was relatively small.From 1931 through
1935 net capital formation in both current and constant dollars was
negative, reaching a maximum of over $800 million in current dollars
and over $1.1 billion in constant dollars in 1933.Again during
World War II net capital formation was negative from 1942 through
1945. The maximum disinvestment occurred in 1944 when it reached
almost $1.5 billion in current dollars and about $1.1 billion in con-
stant dollars.In all, eleven years in the last six decades were
characterized by negative net capital formation.
Cycle averages of net capital formation in current dollars show a
constant rise when the 1925—1950 period is considered a single
cycle. When it is divided into two shorter cycles, there is a slight
decline from the 1905—1925 cycle to the 1925—1941 cycle, but the
1941-1950 cycle again shows an increase to a level higher than any
preceding cycle (Table 7).Net capital formation in constant dol-
TABLE 7
Annual Average Net Capital Formation in Housekeeping Residential
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lars, however, rose only slightly between the first two cycles and
dropped sharply from the 1905—1925 cycle to the 1925—1950 cycle.
When the latter period is considered as two cycles, both show a de-
cline from the 1905—1925 average, with the 1941—1950 average at
an even lower level than that for 1925—1941.
Ratio of Net to Gross Capital Formation
The proportion of gross capital. formation which has resulted in
net additions to residential capital has fluctuated in accordance
with the residential building cycle.In periods of high building ac-
tivity, such as the 1920—1929 and 1940—1950 decades, the ratio has
been at high levels; in trough decades, such as 1910—1919 and par-
ticularly 1930—1939, the ratio has fallen to low or negative levels.
Accordingly decade ratios reveal only great variability in the rela-
tionship between net and gross capital formation.
Ratios derived from net and gross capital formation within the
long cycles in gross capital formation, however, indicate a long-
term downward movement in the proportion of gross capital formation
that resulted in net additions to residential wealth and implicitly,
therefore, a long-term increase in the proportion required to offset
capital consumption (Table 8).This relationship is a result of the
decline in the ratio of gross capital formation to the stock of resi-
dential capital, contrasted with the relative stability in the ratio of
capital consumption to the stock of residential capital.
Expenditures for Nonhouselçee ping Residential Facilities
Expenditures for nonhousekeeping facilities4 exhibit
less evidence of long cyclical swings than do the data for house-
keeping construction, although the period from the middle of the
1890's to the middle of the 1910—1919 decade might be viewed as
one trough-to-trough cycle and the period from the middle of the
1910—1919 decade to sometime in the 1930's or early 1940's as an-
other (Table 9).Disregarding short-term fluctuations, which are
very pronounced in this segment of residential building, expendi-
tures in current dollars show a gradual rise to the end of the 1910—
4Nonhousekeeping residential facilities comprise buildings containing
nonhousekeeping quarters, e.g. transient hotels, tourist cabins, dormitories.
Such expenditures are not, included here in capital formation in hou&e-
keeping residential real estate.
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Ratio of Net Capital Formation to Gross Capital Formation within Long
Cycles in Gross Capital Formation, 1889—1950 and 1892—1950
(per cent)
Current 1929




















1891 13 35 1921 125 131
1q92 9 25 1922 205 229
1893 9 25 1923 230 233
1894 7 20 1924 255 263
1895 5 20 1925 355 363
1896 10 29 1926 410 416
1897 17 50 1927 330 339
1898 12 34 1928 260 266
1899 10 26 1929 245 245
1900 11 27 1930 200 203
1901 38 95 1931 70 77
1902 51 124 1932 40 52
1903 36 85 1933 35 44
1904 24 57 1934 45 51
1905 28 63 1935 50 58
1906 61 126 1936 60 67
1907 45 89 1937 80 80
1908 44 90 1938 75 73
1909 45 89 1939 90 86
1910 40 76 1940 90 85
1911 58 110 1941 95 85
1912 63 117 1942 50 43
1913 46 84 1943 15 12
1914 48 91 1944 25 19
1915 40 75 1945 40 29
1916 60 100 1946 145 95
1917 65 91 1947 125 70
1918 45 55 1948 155 77
1919 75 81 1949 185 91
1950 175 83
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TABLE 10
Ratio of Expenditures for Nonhousekeeping Residential Facilities to


















1919 decade, a more rapid rise to the middle 1920's, a" decline to
the. early 1930's, some recovery prior to World War II, a decline
during the war, and a more substantial recovery in the postwar
period.' I3oth the 1941 and 1949 peaks, however, were far below the
level reached in the middle 1920's. Deflated expenditures followed
essentially the same pattern, except that in the deflated series, the
level in the 1910—1919 decade was somewhat lower in comparison
with that in the preceding decade and the post—1945 rise was more
modest. Deflated expenditures in the postwar period were at about
the same level as expenditures in the late 1930's and in the 1900—
1917 period and less than one-quarter of the level'at the 1926 peak.
As a consequence, expenditures for such facilities since the
1920—1929 decade have declined in importance relative to expendi-
tures for housekeeping dwelling units (Table 10). Decade averages
show a rising ratio of nonhousekeeping to housekeeping expendi-
tures over the four decades following 1890 and a declining ratio
since the 1920's.The ratio for the eleven-year period 1940—1950
was lower than that for any decade in this century, and the ratio
for the boom period 1946-1950 was even lower than that for the
whole decade (2.2 per cent and 2.4 per cent for current and constant
dollar expenditures, respectively).
2. Problems in Methodology and interpretation
Sources and Coverage of the Gross Capital Formation Series
The data underlying the series on gross and net capital formation
in housekeeping residential real estate consist of estimates of ex-
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penditures for new dwelling units, expenditures for additions and
alterations, and allowances for capital consumption. The estimates
of expenditures for new dwelling units and for additions and alter-
ations for the period 1889—1920 are new estimates prepared in con-
nection with the forthcoming monograph, Capital Formation in Resi-
dential Real Estate, Trends and Prospects; the post—1920 estimates
areofficial Bureau of Labor Statistics—Department of Commerce
estimates.The entire series on capital consumption allowances
are new estimates; these allowances are discussed later.
The derivation of the new estimates of expenditures for house-
keeping dwelling units is described in detail in a recent Technical
Paper of the National Bureau of Economic Research.5Essentially
these estimates were based on data gathered in a survey of building
permits issued in 417 cities over varying periods of time between
1870 and 1930.The permit values of authorized residential build-
ing in reporting cities were expanded to regional-size class totals
by the use of population relationships.These regional-size class
totals were summed to yield an urban series, which in turn was ex-
to a nonfarm series by the use of relationships between
urban and rural nonfarm population change and an allowance for the
typically lower cost of rural nonfarm dwelling units.Further ad-
justments were made to include those development costs (archi-
tects' and engineers' fees, land development costs, etc.) which are
not recorded on applications for building permits, for the typical
underestimate of building costs on permit applications, and to con-
vert the adjusted series to a work-put-in-place basis.6These ad-
justments are quite comparable to those made in deriving the of-
ficial Department of Commerce series.
The new additions and alterations estimates were derived by
graphic extrapolation, both as to level and cyclical movement, by
reference to the series on expenditures for new dwelling units and
based on the relationship between these two series in the post—
1920 period.
Housekeeping residential construction is here defined to cover
new private permanent nonfarm housekeeping residential facilities.
Public housing and farm housing, as well as additions and alter-
ations to, and maintenance and repair of, existing residential struc-
tures, are excluded. Temporary structures, structures without house-
'DavidM.Blank, The Volume of Residential Construction, 1889—1950,
Natiotial Bureau.of Economic Research, Technical Paper 9, 1954.
6The same procedure was employed in deriving the new estimates of ex-
penditures for nonhousekeeping residential facilities (see ibid.).
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keeping facilities,' and trailers are also excluded. Living quarters
for employees in warehouses and factories are excluded but the
construction figures include the total cost of structures that contain
both dwelling units and stores since •the housing accommodations
usually account for a major part of the total cost of building such
structures.
Expenditures for residential facilities are further defined to in-
cludethe nonstructural site improvements associated with resi-
dential building.The cost of the land underlying new structures,
however, is excluded from the expenditure measures.Some dis-
cussion of the problems created in separating land from structure
values is reserved for a later section of this paper.
Included in the expenditures measures also is the value of all
•. typesof immobile equipment which when installed become an
integral part of the structure and are necessary to any general use
of the structure.Plumbing, heating, air conditioning and lighting
equipment •.. areexamples of service facilities which are con-
sidered a part of construction.In general, construction does not
include the procurement of special purpose equipment designed to
prepare the structure for specific use. Examples of such equipment
are ..• refrigerators,ranges or dishwashers in The ex-
clusion of separable special-purpose equipment from the measures
of expenditures for residential construction has important ramifica-
tions both in the interpretation of the capital formation figures and
in the analysis of the factors determining the volume of capital for-
mation in this field.Thus, over time an increasing proportion of
what the consumer feels to be joint expenditures on the home and
its equipment has probably been accounted for by the acquisition
of items not captured in the construction statistics.Indeed there
may well have been a significant amount of competition in the con-
suzner's budget between outlays for the structure and for household
equipment.
All official construction figures as well as the new estimates
presented here are given on a work-put-in-place basis. That is, the
volume of residential construction in any given period of time is
defined as "coat of the materials put in place" during that period
of time, "the wages of the workers who placed the materials and
'EssentiaUy permanent cooking facilities.
Constructionand BuildingMaterials, Statistical Supplement (known as
Construction and Construction Materialsthrough1950), Dept. of Commerce,
May 1951, p.1.
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the appropriate charges to the work for overhead and profit"9 Thus,
unlike the case of other producers' or consumers' durable goods,
gross capital formation here is not measured by acquisitions of the
goods by final purchasers and by net changes in inventory of pro-
ducers of the durable goods.Rather the accounts of the construc-
tion industry and those of the purchasers of new residential struc-
tures are partially consolidated and only the gross additions to the
"work in process" of the construction industry are credited to
gross capital formation in residential real estate.
An interesting and, at certain times in the past, an important
elementof construction expenditures omitted from the historic rec-
ord of residential capital formation is the amount of resources ex-
pended in the development of "premature" subdivisions.These
were subdivisions laid out, usually in boom periods, in anticipation
ofresidentialbuilding which never materialized.Substantial
amounts of resources were invested in grading, building of streets
and sidewalks, etc., in these subdivisions. These resources were
largely wasted since the facilities either largely succumbed to the
wear and tear of the elements or had become obsolete by the time
residential building took place.In the present boom, however,
there has been relatively little investment in land development un-
associated with actual building operations.
Since the historic estimates of expenditures for residential con-
struction are based on building permit data, expenditures for land
development not accompanied by residential building are nowhere
captured in the series.Nor has depreciation been charged against
this form of capital.
The estimates of gross capital formation include expenditures
for additions and alterations of existing residential structures but
exclude expenditures for maintenance and repair of such structures.
The conceptual grounds for this distinction involve the view that
expenditures on existing structures which would have increased
the value of such structures if they had been incurred at the time
of original construction are considered increments to the capital
stock of the nation and therefore part of capital formation; con-
versely, expenditures used simply to maintain the current value of
structures are excluded.
In practice, the line of demarcation between additions and alter-
ations expense and maintenance and repair expense is often quite
9Roland V. Murray and Bruce M. Fowler, "Estimating Expenditures for
New Construction," Techniques of Preparing Major BLS Statistical Series,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. 993, 1950, p. 50.
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indeterminate.For example some expenditures on alterations may
substitute for or include some maintenance expense.Conversely
maintenance and repair expense may include some capital additions,
particularly when the maintenance expenditures involve thein-
stallation of facilities of higher quality.Further, the exclusion
from capital formation of maintenance expense required to maintain
the current value of structures is conceived of in terms of main-
taining current values after allowance for a "normal" amount of
depreciation, which in turn is usually defined as the decline in
value of structures over time under conditions of "normal" niainte-
nance and repair.
Estimates of expenditures for residential additions and altera-
tions, even for current periods, are subject to very wide margins of
error and probably involve a considerable amount of underestima-
tion.The official BLS-Commerce estimates covering the period
1915 to date are primarily based on bench-mark estimates derived
from the 1935—1936 and 1941 studies of consumer expenditures.
Estimates for other years are obtained by.the government agencies
by interpolation and extrapolation on the basis of building permit
data for additions, alterations, and repairs, adjusted for changes
in family income and in the number of dwelling units standing.'°
The interindustry study for 1947, developed by the BLS, con-
cluded on the basis of data from the Survey of Consumer Finances
and other materials that nonfarm additions and alterations in 1947
probably amounted to $1.183 billion, about 60 per cent above the
official estimates." The divergencebetween the official estimates
for 1947 and the estimate developed by the interindustry study may
have been unusually large because of the particular characteristics
of the years just following World War II.Owners during this period
caught up with a great number of capital improvements deferred
during the depression and war periods.Also rent control placed a
premium on conversions since, under certain circumstances, con-
verted units were exempt from control.In other words the under-
statement in official estimates may have been somewhat smaller in
other years.But there appears to be no way to measure the abso-
lute amount of understatement or its variation over time.
10Constructionand Construction Materials, Statistical Supplement, May
1950, p. 80.
ILDavid I. Siskind, "Construction, A Final Demand Sector in the 1947
InterindustryRelations Study,"in"Input-Output Analysis, Technical
Supplement," multilithed, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1954,
Chap. 4, p. 11.
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Capital Consumption Allowances
The successful passage from gross to net residential capital for-
mation rests upon the accuracy of the annual allowance for capital
consumption.Since capital consumption is a large and increasing
offset to gross capital formation, wide variations in net capital for-
mation may result from the type of depreciation formula selected
and even from small differences in the annual rate of depreciation.
Although other definitions are possible, depreciation is here de-
fined as the progressive diminution in the productive efficiency of
a house as it ages, indicated by a decline in value.Since houses
of various ages pass through the market, this loss in value is best
determined by actual market price rather than through the adoption
of accounting conventions found necessary in the case of most non-
marketable durable assets. Statistically the amount of depreciation
is calculated in this paper as the difference between the current
market value of a house and the estimated current Cost of reproduc-
tion of an identical or nearly identical substitute. The current Cost
of reproduction can be ascertained alternatively (1) from the market
price of an equivalent new house, or (2) since it is practically im-
possible to find new houses even roughly equivalent to houses
fifty years old, from the estimated cost of reproduction given by
competent appraisers. The market write-down of value thus calcu-
lated will, of course, reflect both the physical wear and tear of a
structure and obsolescence due to style change.
The derivation of a depreciation scheme directly from value data
has two advantages over the more conventional method of estimating
the depreciation rate as the reciprocal of the average length of life
of a structure, measured in years.In the first place, no firm lon-
gevity data exist.Not only must longevity be assumed but also a
terminal value of the structure at the time of demolition.It should
be realized that the value of demolished structures is far from zero;
indeed since deniolitions are the result, more often than not, of
supersession of land use, these terminal values are often of sub-
stantial (but unknown) average size. Second, knowledge of average
physical life lends itself only to the adoption of a linear depreci-
ation method and, unlike direct value data, yields nothing about
the time pattern of depreciation over the life of the structure.
Usable value data exist in the files of the Federal housing Ad-
ministration and in the work of William M. Iload and 'Raymond
Goldsmith which permit the calculation of measures of depreciation
as defined above.These data support an increasingly accepted
belief that official Bulletin F and Department of Commerce depreci-
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ation formulas, linear depreciation at rates ranging from 2 to 3 per
cent, overstate the amount and inadequately describe the time dis-
tribution of actual depreciation.The average residential structure
seems to have a physical life substantially in excess of thirty-three
to fifty years.In 1940 about 600,000 occupied, i.e. productive,
dwelling units over eighty years old were still standing, a number
representing a substantial proportion of all nonfarm dwelling units
built before 1860; over one-third of the 1890 housing inventory was
still standing in 1940.The available evidence also suggests, at
least in a rapidly growing urban economy, that structure mortality
other than accidental loss has been influenced much more by site
obsolescence, as our urban land-use patterns have changed, than
by the physical wear and tear or obsolescence of the structures
themselves.With average maintenance and repairs, relatively few
dwelling units are unable to attract occupancy at some rental suf-
ficient to cover at least operating costs.In 1950 the number of
dwelling units reported dilapidated and vacant constituted only 0.7
per cent of the norifarm inventory, and even of this number many
were undoubtedly still on the market.
Hoad's stud?2 reveals that houses fifty years old have experi-
enced a loss in value averaging 0.6 per cent per year.His work is
based on two samples of single-family houses of different ages:
bungalows and lVr-2 story frame houses sold on the open market
and for which bona fide market prices could be obtained.The
average market price of each age class, expressed as a ratio to the
priceof a comparable new house, indicatesthat. fifty-year-old
bungalows had suffered a 35 per cent loss in value and fifty-year-
old frame houses a smaller loss of 26 per cent, equivalent to average
linear rates of 0.7 and 0.5 per cent respectively. The depreciation
curve for bungalows in particular was nonlinear and showed a rela-
tively greater value decline in early compared to later life.
The rates derived by Iload are strikingly low and for a number of
reasons somewhat understate the probable rate of depreciation0 His
market price ratios are based on values inclusive of land and tend
to yield a lower schedule of depreciation than for structure alone.
Second, the price ratio of old to new houses understates the decline
in value from actual reproduction cost.No matter how careful the
M. Hoad, "Real Estate Prices—A Study of Residential Real
Estate in Lucas County, Ohio," unpublished dissertation, University of
Michigan, 1942.Hoad's study covers the years 1917—1938 but the market
price data from which his depreciation curves are drawn are restricted to
the period of the 1920's.
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effortsto maintain sample homogeneity may be, in an empirical
study of market sales it is exceedingly difficult to obtain structure
comparability.Older houses, especially those coming into the
market, tend to be larger than newer structures.13The price of a
new house may be considerably lower therefore than the cost of re-
producing its older counterpart. A third element of bias arises from
the fact that those older houses which are actually sold may be
subject to less than average obsolescence and more than an average
amount of maintenance, repairs, additions, and alterations.
TABLE 11
Selected Characteristics of a Sample of Existing Single-Family Houses
Securing Mortgages Insured by FHA, September-December 1939
CurrentAverage
Estimated Value Per
Total Current as Per Cent
Fl/A FHAReplace- Cent ofAnnual
PropertyValuement CostFl/AAge ValueDecline

















1938$5851 $4,703 $4,935 $849 1 95.3 4.7 14.5
1937 5,543 4,505 4,766 779 2 94.5 2.8 14.0
1936 6,440 4,989 5,640 1,107 3 88.5 3.8 17.2
1935 6,452 5,089 6,187 1,070 4 82.3 4.4 16.6
1930—1934 5,518 4,368 5,506 904 7 79.3 2.9 16.4
1925—1929 5,024 3,864 5,321 94612 72.6 2.3 18.8
1920—19244,846 3,596 5,492 1,02917 65.5 2.0 21.2
1915—1919 4,608 3,427 5,992 99422 57.2 1.9 21.6
1910-1914 4,698 3,393 6,002 1,08527 56.5 1.6 23.1
1900—1909 4,212 3,127 5,978 92934 52.3 1.4 22.1
Pre—1900 4,033 2,788 7,766 1,06352 35.9 1.2 26.4
The first two biases can be illustrated by the FHA data shown
in Table 11. The decline in value of fifty-year-old structures, when
measured inclusive of land, is 0.65 per cent per year compared to
0.82 per Cent per year when land is Second, when the
average value of the oldest houses, $2,788, is compared with its
estimated replacement cost of $7,766 (Column 4), a 64 per cent
value decline is noted, while the ratio of old to new house values
without regard to the comparability obtainable by reproduction cost
estimates yields only a 42 per cent decline (column 3). The larger
t3George Katona, Relevant Considerations in Recent Home Purchases,
Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1953.
'4Thus the oldest houses (inclusive of land) show about a one-third de-
cline in value relative to the newest houses, $4,033 compared to a 1935-.
1938 average of $6,072 (Table 11, col. 2).Exclusive of land the valuede-
dine is 42 per cent, $2,788 conpared to $4,822 (Col. 3).
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size of these older structures can be inferred from their relatively
high ieplacement costs.
Goldsmith found from value and age of. structure data published
in the Financial Survey of Urban Housing13 a 50 per cent value de-
cline for houses forty-five years old, implying an average annual
(linear) rate of 1,1 per cent.16While owner estimates of value or
age of structure may not be completely trustworthy, the results are
nevertheless useful both because the data were not restricted to
houses coming into the market and because of the wide geographic
coverage.The fact that these data could not be adjusted for site
value or for structure homogeneity probably operated toward under-
stating the depreciation rate as it has been defined here.
According to the value data collected by the FHA from a sample
of 1,500 single-family houses, structures with an average age of
fifty-two years are worth about 36 per cent of their estimated cost
of reproduction, implying a decline in value of about 1.2 per cent
per year on a linear basis (Table ii).These data, which are in
many ways the most usable of all, since structure values are dis-
tinguished from land values and both reproduction costs and current
values are estimated by experienced appraisers, further indicate a
pronounced curvilinear pattern in the form of a convex (to the origin)
curve.But even in connection with these data, a number of factors
have to be considered before establishing a final rater
1. A depreciation rate derived from 1939 value data is likely to
be higher than would be found in a period of high or even "normal"
housing market activity.The market rate of depreciation is not
likely to be cyclically stable since the value discount for age ap-
plied by buyers and sellers probably varies with conditions in the
housing market.Hoad's results derived from the 1920's implied a
much lower rate of depreciation even after giving consideration to
the biases held to be inherent in his data.
2. Eligibility requirements imposed by the FHA may result in the
same "marketability" bias discussed earlier, namely that the
sample structures may have experienced less than average obsoles-
cence and that such structures have received better than average
maintenance, additions, and alterations.Since additions and alter-
ations are included in gross capital formation, any depreciation
rate derived from actual value data requires some enlargement. The
'3Financial Survey of Urban Housing, Dept. of Commerce, 1937.
16Raymond W. Goldsmith, "A Perpetual Inventory of National Wealth,"
Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume Fourteen, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1951, pp. 2 1—24.
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data on additions and alterations are so poor that some writers
(Goldsmith, for example) speak of omitting them entirely from gross
capital formation, compensating for the omission by using a rela-
tively lower depreciation raie.t'If done with care, the estimates
of net capital formation would remain the same irrespective of which
of the two procedures was adopted.The understatement in gross
capital formation would be matched by a corresponding understate-
ment in capital consumption.'6
3. The derived rate refers to single-family houses. Consideration
must therefore be given to multifamily structures, which are gener-
ally thought to decline more rapidly in value than single-family
units.
4. A depreciation curve derived from market data, dealing only as
it must with surviving houses, does not make allowances for houses
actually demolished.An adjustment for this factor is discussed
below.
On the basis of scanty available data, a compound rate of 2 per
cent annually was thought to yield the best results if a separate
allowance were made for demolitions. A 2 per cent rate applied to
remaining balances not oniy approximates the magnitude of decline
suggested by the empirical data but also permits a convex decline
in value.19 Had the same data and adjustments been used to derive
"Ibid., pp. 22—24.
laThere are, however, some objections to the second procedure. First,
it is obvious that the ratios of net to gross capital formation would be sig-
nificantly altered.For example under the first procedure if gross capital
formation in a given year is estimated at $500 million ($450 million outlay
on housekeeping units and $50 million on additions and alterations) and
capital consumption is estimated at $200 million, the ratio of net to gross
is 60 per cent.Under the second procedure gross capital formation would
be taken at $450 milliorr and capital consumption at $150 million, yielding
a net-to-gross ratio of 67 per cent.Furthermore neither the scope of gross
capital formation nor capital consumption would be equivalent to other
economic sectors and thus limit both comparison and summation into more
comprehensive totals.Another objection is the fact that the series on
additions and alterations are, in effect, brought in by the back door with
annual implied magnitudes equal to the annual understatement in both the
gross capital formation and capital consumption accounts. Such estimates
might better be made explicit rather than burned within a pair of self-
canceling errors.
"A declining balance method of depreciation offers a further advantage
in thatit does not depend upon the original costs of existing capital.
There was no need therefore to make estimates of residential construction
and price changes for the early part of the nineteenth century,an ex-
tremely hazardoue undertaking, in order to compute capital consumption of
the inventory standing in 1889.Instead the wealth estimate prepared for
that year could be directly employed.The annual depreciation charge is
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a linear rate, a level of about 1.4 per cent would have been se-
lected.Incomparison with the 2 per cent compound rate, such a
linear rate produces about thesameamount of total depreciation
over the first forty years of structure life, except that it is dis-
tributed more heavily during the second two and less during the
first two decades. Under the linear rate there is complete extinction
of value at the end of approximately seventy years; under the com-
pound rate 25 per cent of value remains at the end of such a period
and some value remains as long as the structure stays in existence.
No depreciation formula is likely to be completely satisfactory.
Even the adopted rate results in lower depreciation charges during
early life than the FHA data imply.Itis quite possible that a
curvilinear method based on a varying rather than constant rate
would offer the most realistic description of value decline.Such a
schedule of rates could then be varied with cyclical changes, with
a trend factor for the increasing proportion of structures containing
wiring, plumbing, and other special equipment subject to relatively
high rates of depreciation and for such special circumstances as
undermaintenance of real estate during periods of rent control, Re-
finements of this kind must await superior data. The constant rate
method at least avoids some of the pitfalls of the linear method,
Moreover it is at least as easy to use and comprehend, traditionally
the main commendation of linear depreciation.
Allowance for Dernolitions
The allowance for demolitions made here (Table 12) is so small
in relation to total depreciation that it might have been totally ig-
nored or dealt with by a slight increase in the depreciation rate.
Separate estimation is justified less by a dubious gain in precision
than by a desire to distinguish between the two very different kinds
of capital consumption. The demolition of an occupied or inhabit-
able residential structure to make way for an office building, public
improvement, or even an apartment house does not represent the
same kind of accelerated depreciation that occurs when a usable
machine tool is rendered obsolete by the introduction of a newer
type.In the latter case the relative efficiency of the existing tool
made by charging 2 per cent of the value of residential capital at the be-
ginning of the year against each year's gross capital formation.The re-
sulting net capital formation for the year is then added to beginning-year
value and the process is repeated in each succeeding year.To take ac-
count of depreciation on houses built during any given year, the assump-
tion is made that all such housing ha8 undergone six months' depreciation
by year-end.
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TABLE 12














Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1889 167 12 179 427 31 458
1890 181 13 194 463 33 496
1891 187 14 201 494 36 530
1892 193 14 207 525 38 563
1893 203 15 218 554 40 594
1894 205 15 220 579 42 621
1895 212 15 228 608 44 652
1896 223 16 239 635 46 681
1897 228 17 245 663 48 711
1898 247 18 265 687 50 737
1899 273 20 293 708 52 760
1900 294 23 317 723 57 780
1901 296 23 318 737 58 795
1902 313 24 337 754 59 813
1903 331 26 356 769 60 829
1904 334 26 360 787 61 848
1905 364 28 392 817 63 880
1906 418 32 450 854 66 920
1907 452 35 487 884 69 953
1908 451 35 486 911 71 982
1909 484 38 521 941 73 1,014
1910 516 43 559 969 81 1,050
1911 520 43 563 991 82 1,073
1912 546 45 591 1,014 84 1,098
1913 538 45 583 1,037 86 1,123
1914 554 46 600 1,062 88 1,150
1915 580 48 629 1,085 90 1,175















1919 1,027 87 1,113 1,115 94 1,209
1920 1,325 119 1,443 1,116 100 1,216
1921 1,071 94 1,166 1,123 99 1,222
1922 1,014 89 1,102 1,156 101 1,257
1923 1,187 103 1,291 1,208 105 1,313
1924 1,235 107 1,342 1,275 110 1,385
1925 1,299 113 1,411 1,350 117 1,467
1926 1,384 120 1,504 1,428 124 1,552
1927 1,435 125 1,560 1,501 131 1,632
1928 1,502 131 1,633 1,566 137 1,703
1929 1,613 142 1,755 1,613 142 1,755
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Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1930 1,589 79 1,668 1,630 81 1,711
1931 1,468 73 1,541 1,633 81 1,714
1932 1,234 62 1,296 1,622 81 1,703
1933 1,221 61 1,282 1,602 80 1,682
1934 1,311 65 1,376 1,581 79 1,660
1935 1,261 63 1,323 1,566 78 1,644
1936 1,316 65 1,381 1,563 77 1,640
1937 1,468 72 1,540 1,567 77 1,644
1938 1,516 75 1,591 1,574 78 1,652
1939 1,555 76 1,632 1,587 78 1,665
1940 1,635 97 1,732 1,608 95 1,703
1941 1,791 105 1,896 1,634 96 1,730
1942 1,905 113 2,018 1,645 98 1,743
1943 1,978 118 2,096 1,632 97 1,729
1944 2,127 127 2,254 1,610 96 1,703
1945 2,240 134 2,374 1,590 95 1,685
1946 2,480 147 2,627 1,589 94 1,683
19473,050 180 3,230 1,612 95 1,707
19483,475 204 3,680 1,651 97 1,748
19493,465 202 3,667 1,696 99 1,795
19503,790 220 4,008 102 1,859
is so sharply, reduced as to give it zero (or scrap) value.In the
case of site supersession the relative efficiency of the structure
itself is not reduced; the demolition is occasioned by the inability
to transport the structure elsewhere. Moreover while a depreciation
charge is viewed as a continuous and regular consumption of capi-
tal, demolitions are probably quite irregular and related to causes
which cannot be impowided. within the phrase, "the passage of
time."
Demolitions caused by casualty are more closely related to the
concept of depreciation since most of this destruction can largely
be attributed to the perhaps actuarily stable action of the elements.
Yet for a number of reasons even this form of capital consumption
ought to be clearly distinguished from ordinary depreciation.First
some writers prefer to treat catastrophic destruction as an item of
capital adjustment rather than capital consumption.2°Second the
20Solomon Fabricant, Capital Consumption and Adjustment, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1938, p. 19.
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assumption of "natural" causation is valid only in the absence of
war.In the social accounting system of other and less fortunate
nations, the destruction of residential capital in wartime can hardly
constitute an item of ordinary
The statistical data available for making allowances for demo-
litions are notoriously weak even for recent years.Decade esti-
mates of the total number of dwelling units demolished have been
made by David L. Wickens for the period 1890_192921 and by BLS
for the period 1930_1949.22 These estimates are the starting point
of the demolitions allowance.
A ratio was derived of annual demolitions (taken as one-tenth of
the total in each decade) to the average annual size of the inventory
(taken as the average of the opening and closing inventories of
each decade). These ratios were then converted to value ratios on
the assumption that demolished dwelling units have a somewhat
lower than average value since (1) structures demolished because
of supersession are probably older than the average structure and,
(2) a large proportion of losses due to storm, flood, and fire occur
in rural nonfarrn areas, where dwelling units are typically lower in
value.Such assumptions are obviously crude but since the total
demolition allowance accounts for only 10 per cent of the full an-
nual capital consumption charge, even wide errors cannot affect the
results greatly.
Corn paris on of Residential Capital Format ion
with Residential Wealth Estimates
Estimates of net capital formation both for totals and for indi-
vidual sectors have in the past years been subject to test by wealth
data.aaOne might add that until very recent years this has been
virtually the only purpose for which wealth data have been intro-
duced into the mainstream of economic research.But as Simon
Kuznets has pointed out,2' there are severe limitations on the use-
fulness of such tests—limitations which were brought sharply into
focus when the residential capital formation estimates were cuniu-
2tDavid L. Wickens, Residential Real Estate, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1941, p. 54.
22F'or 1930—1939, M. H. Naigles, "Housing and the Increase in Popula-
tion," Monthly Labor Review, March 1942.The estimates for .1940—1949,
still unofficial, are contained in a BLS release entitled "Changes in the
Nonf arm Housing Inventory, 1940—1950," February 28, 1952.
23Simon Kuznets, National Product since 1869, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1946, Part IV; Goldsmith, op. cit.
24Op. cit., p. 198.
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latedand comparedwith census-type residential wealth totals at
bench-mark dates.
Existing bench-mark residential wealth data fall into two cate-
gories, depending upon the type of census from which they are de-
rived.Since housing is a form of real property, it is subject to fre-
quent censuses conducted by tax-assessing officials.Since these
officials, becrause of the public records to which they have access
and the nature of their responsibilities and even temperaments, are
hardly likely to overlook any houses, the coverage of such a census
is practically complete. Assessment data, therefore, on the grounds
of coverage, reliability, and frequency of collection would appear
to offer an ideal potential source for residential wealth estimates.
Unfortunately this potential has been far from realized in the
past.In the first place a major effort is required to gather the as-
sessment data of every county in the United States and to process
into usable form. Although periodic collections of tax assess-
ment data have been made by the Bureau of the Census, the ex-
tremely wide diversity of assessing practices requires enormously
detailed adjustments to reduce the data to a common basis of valu-
ation such as market value.It is notoriously difficult to obtain
accurate ratios of assessed to market value for even asinglecounty
and a herculean task to achieve, in effect, a countrywide adjust-
ment factor.
A second weakness is the fact that data have not been broken
down by type of real estate.As a result the value of residential
real estate has traditionally been derived as a residual by sub-
tracting estimated amounts for various classes of nonresidential
realestate from the total value of real estate.Like all residuals,
a residential wealth estimate obtained inthis manner fully reflects
andeven magnifies not oniy all the errors present inthe total but
errors in each of the subtrahends. Clearly such an estimate can be
used only with diffidence.
The other type of residential wealth estimate is based upon the
residential rent and value data reported by the Census of Popula-
tion in 1930 and the Census of Housing in 1940 and 1950.Since
nearly every dwelling unit is visited (including vacant units in
1940 and 1950), the coverage of such a census is nearly as good
as the coverage obtainable from assessment records and, in addi-
tion, has the inestimable advantage of yielding data directly re-
lated to nonfarni residential real estate.
This type of census, however, falls short in a number of respects
from fulfilling the conditions of an ideal residential wealth census.
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In the first place direct value data are obtained only for owner-
occupied dwelling units.As far as the tenant-occupied portion of
the housing inventory is concerned, only rent data are solicited.
Average rent is then transformed into average value by means of a
so-called gross rent multiplier; these transformations may involve
significant errors because of the difficulties of ascertaining an ac-
curate multiplier. Second, the value data are obtained directly from
the occupants themselves. It is possible that these reported values
tend to lag behind changes in actual market value, particularly
during periods of rapid fluctuations.It is also likely that varying
amounts of consumer capital normally transferred with a house,
such as screens, garden equipment, stoves, refrigerators, etc., are
often included in the value report. The 1940 value data are further
weakened by the fact that they are reported on a dwelling unit
rather than on a structure basis; the 1930 value data, as will be
shown later, are quite ambiguous in this respect.Dwelling units
and structures are equivalent oniy in the case of a single-family
house.While there are a substantial number of houses occupied
jointly by the owner and one or more tenants, such houses are not
valued as an entity. The owner reports the value of his own quar-
ters,not an easy task for the inexperienced, while the value of the
tenant-occupied portion of the structure is obtained by the afore-
mentioned transformation method.On the other hand data on a
dwelling unit rather than structure basis have one advantage—the
exclusion of the nonresidential portion of a building, such as stores
and offices.
The Testing Procedure
Theforegoing discussion indicatesthat existing residential
wealth estimates undoubtedly contain varying degrees of error
which restrict the usefulness of the capital formation check.In ad-
dition to actual errors, the check is further weakened by the steps
necessary to convert the capital formation estimates into the requi-
site form for testing and by a number of incomparabilities in the
coverage of the two sets of data:
1. In a number of instances the census wealth estimates repre-
sent combined land and structure values.It is obvious therefore
that some estimated value for the sites underlying residential real
estate must be added to the cumulated capital formation estimates
or subtracted from the census wealth totals.Reliable information
on site value and its changes over time are exceedingly difficult
to obtain.in the absence of data on the physical quantity and
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average price per unit of land, site values are most readily obtain-
able by means of a ratio of site value to total value. Annual data
on these ratios since the middle 1930's are provided by the FHA
for a large number of areas.This series was here augmented by
some scattered bench-mark data for the early 1930's, the 1920's,
and the turn of the century. These data pointed to the existence of
a fairly regular declining trend in the share of land in the total
value of residential real estate—from about 40 per cent in 1890 to
18 per cent in 1950. Annual ratios between bench-mark years were
formed by interpolation (Table 13, column 3).As far as both level
and trend are concerned, this series of land ratios produced more
satisfactory results in separating land from structure values than
those given by other wealth estimators.25 No attempt was made to
adjust these land ratios for the fact that an allowance for
in preparing residential sites has been included in the capital for-
niation estimate. The possible double counting error would appear
to be small.
Even if it is granted that the land ratios used in our wealth check
are tolerably good, it is difficult to maintain that so artificially
interpolated a series does not contain wide margins of error in indi-
vidual years.Such errors will of course produce corresponding
errors in structure values and reduce the usefulness of the wealth
data.
2. Other problems arise because the census wealth data appear in
the form of current dollar totals, based in one way or another on
market values.The capital formation estimates cumulated to any
bench-mark data require revaluation into the bench-mark year's
price level.This revaluation, which was accomplished by means
of the construction cost index discussed below,is,of course,
fraught with peril.%Vaiving the possibility of purely statistical de-
ficiencies, there are sufficient short-run differences between the
movement of costs and prices to produce substantial differences in
any bench-mark year.Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that the
knotty problem of valuation is probably the single most important
drawback to wealth checks.
3. Finally there are a number of problems arising from differences
in coverage.First, the wealth estimates include public housing and
25The explanation for the sharp decline in land ratios lies primarily in
the growing use of automobiles, which opened up vast new areas of resi-
dential land.Another factor is the spread of the apartment house in rela-
tively expensive central urban sites, which causes land ratios to fall even
in the older settled part of the city.
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1889 22,050 8,600 40.0 5,733 14,333 1890a 22,918 8,984 40.0 5,989 14,973
1890 23,786 9,324 40.0 6,216 15,540
1891 25,087 9,508 39.6 6,234 15,742
1892 26,814 9,868 39.3 6,389 16,257
1893 28,024 10,285 38.9 6,548 16,833
1894 29,301 10,373 38.5 6,494 16,867
1895 30,816 10,755 38.2 6,648 17,403
1896 32,080 11,260 37.8 6,843 18,103
1897 33,459 11,510 37.4 6,877 18,387
1898 34,522 12,393 37.1 7,310 19,703
1899 35,525 13,677 36.1 7,930 21,607
1900 35,984 14,610 36.3 8,326 22,936
1901 36,892 14,794 36.0 8,322 23,116
1902 37,640 15,621 35.6 8,635 24,256
1903 38,418 16,520 35.2 8,974 25,494
1904 39,425 16,756 34.9 8,983 25,739
1905 41,385 18,416 34.5 9,702 28,118
1906 43,085 21,069 34.1 10,902 31,971
1907 44,378 22,677 33.8 11,578 34,255
1908 45,715 22,629 33,4 11,348 33,977
1909 47,406 24,367 33.0 12,002 36,369
1910 48,499 25,801 32.7 12,536 38,337
1911 49,539 26,008 32.3 12,409 38,417
1912 50,711 27,283 31.9 12,780 40,063
1913 51,927 26,950 31,6 12,451 39,401
1914 53,051 31.2 12,558 40,251
1915 54,306 29,054 30.8 12,932 41,986
1916 55,510 31,641 30.5 13,886 45,527
1917 55,613 37,038 30.1 15,949 52,987
1918 55,008 43,566 29.7 18,406 61,972
1919 55,317 50,947 29.4 21,216 72,163
1920 55,122 65,430 29.0 26,715 92,155
1921 55,976 53,401 28.6 21,390 74,791
1922 58,316 51,143 28.3 20,186 71,329
1923 61,245 60,204 27.9 23,297 83,501
1924 64,818 62,809 27.5 23,824 86,633
1925 68,715 66,104 27.2 24,698 90,802
1926 72,519 70,271 26.8 25,728 95,999
1927 75,939 72,598 26.4 26,041 98,639
1928 78,938 75,702 26.1 26,736 102,438
1929 80,563 80,563 25.7 27,866 108,429
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1930 80,775 78,756 25.3 26,674 105,430
1931 80,724 72,571 25.0 24,190 96,761
1932 79,796 60,725 24.6 19,812 80,537
1933 78,685 59,958 24.2 19,142 79,100
1934 77,724 64,433 23.9 20,236 84,669
1935 77,273 62,205 23.5 19,109 81,314
1936 77,420 65,188 23.1 19,582 84,770
1937 77,692 72,797 22.8 21,500 94,297
1938 78,028 75,140 22.4 21,690 96,831
1939 79,006 77,426 22.0 21,838 99,264
1940 80,149 81,512 21.7 22,590 104,102
1941 81,535 89,362 21.3 24,186 113,548
1942 81,230 94,064 20.9 24,858 118,922
1943 80219 97,225 20.6 25,225 122,450
1944 79,111 104,506 20.2 26,454 130,960
1945 78,178 110,153 19.8 27,195 137,348
1946 78,974 123,278 19.5 29,862 153,140
1947 80,536 152,412 19.1 35,984 188,396
1948 82,790 174,273 187 40,085 214,358
1949 84,951 173,555 183 38,875 212,430
1950 88,855 191,571 18.0 42,052 233,623
1, 1890.
certain types of marginal dwelling units, trailers, temporary houses,
etc., which are specifically excluded from the capital formation
series. The capital formation estimates capture, however, the value
of the incidental nonresidential portions of residential structures
which are, as stated earlier, excluded from the later wealth esti-
mate but are probably included in the earlier estimate based on as-
sessment data.
Second, the increment to wealth for any single sector between
two points in time is not simply a function of gtoss capital forma-
tion and capital consumption.Intersector transfers of wealth are
constantly in process.The entry of farm houses into the nonfarm
residentialcategory between two bench-mark dates because of
change in use (or even change in census definitions) will be re-
flected in the census wealth estimate but not in the cumulation
series since obviously no capital formation has taken place. Like-
wise when a residential structure is partially or wholly converted
41PRIVATE NONFARM RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION
to nonresidential use, the transfer remains unrecorded in the cumu-
lated capital formation series since there has been no capital con-
sumption, but will presumably diminish the census wealth total. An
accurate wealth check would require a reasonably complete series
of transfers of this kind, but unfortunately there are little or no
data except for recent years which measure shifts of wealth to and
from the private residential sector.Certainly one major type of
transfer, the occupancy of former farm houses by nonfarm families,
has served to enlarge residential wealth, while a second type,
shifts between residential and nonresidential, has caused it to
shrink.There is no way of knowing, however, what the size or
sign of the net balance may be.
Theinevitable consequence of the incomparabilities between
residential wealth estimates and cumulated net residential capital
formation arising from dissimilarities in coverage and valuation is
the inability to interpret with any degree of confidence the differ-
ences in bench-mark estimates. Clearly a 10 per cent or even a 20
per cent discrepancy in any one year could easily be attributable
to inherent differences in the data. Yet a difference of this magni-
tude can utterly destroy the usefulness of wealth data for checking
capital formation over short periods of time. For testing time series
covering long periods of time, wealth data are more serviceable
since any errors present in either the initial or terminal wealth esti-
mates are relatively small compared to the total increment to wealth.
The Checks at Bench-mark Dates
The check is carried out in two stages.First, the cumulated net
capital formation estimates, augmented by estimated allowances
for land, are compared in terms of current dollar totals because the
underlying differences in data are best examined in this form (Table
14). Second, the census-type wealth estimates are reduced to struc-
ture values by removal of land value and then deflated, permitting a
direct check on capital formation in constant dollars.
As a base for the Cumulation of capital formation, a residential
wealth estimate for 1890 was formed by multiplying the number of
dwelling units by an estimated average value per dwelling unit.
This resulted in a residential wealth total of $15 billion, quite close
to Kuznets' estimate of $14.4 billion, derived from assessment data
(Table 14).Since the starting estimates are so similar, they are
practically removed as sources of discrepancy in subsequent bench-
mark years.
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TABLE 14
Comparison of Cumulative and Independent Residential
Wealth Estimates, 1890—1950
(billions of current dollars)





















































1949 173.6 38.9212.4 .... ....260.0
Note: Cumulated wealth estimates are for June 1 in 1890 and for Decem-
ber 31 in succeeding years.Bench-mark wealth estimates are for June 1
through 1912 and for April 1 in succeeding years, except in 1922, Doane's
entry for 1930, and 1938 where the month and day were not available.
aFrom Table 13.
bSimon Kuznets, National Produce since 1869, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1946, pp. 201—207.
CRobert R. Doane, The Anatomy of American Wealth, Harper, 1940,pp.
213, 224, and 251.Doane's procedure is essentially similar to that of
Kuznets.Apparently as a result of a typographical error, a 1922 estimate
of $67 billion is given on p. 116.Subsequent discussion indicates that
billion is the total actually intended.
David Wjckens, Residential Real Estate, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1941, p. 3 ff.His assumed land ratio is given on p. 4.
A. Keller, A Study of the Physical Assets, Sometimes Called Wealth,
of the United States, 1922—1933, University of Notre Dame, 1939, pp.
116—120.
Census of Housing, Series H-1943, No. 1.
estimated in Leo Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick,
CapitalFormation in Residential Real Estate: Trends and Prospects,
Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research,
1956.
On December 31, 1900, the next bench-mark, cumulated capital
formation amounts to $22.9 billion, compared to Kuznets' estimate
of $20.0 billion for June 1.In view of the small difference in the
1890 estimate and seven months' difference in dates, such a dis-
crepancy appears small and quite reconcilable.Yet when compari-
son is made later in terms of net capital formation for the decade,
even this small difference can be seen to vitiate the check.
In 1912 the agreement is quite good. The $0.9 billion difference
between the cumulation estimate of $40.1 billion and Kuznets' esti-
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mate of $39.2 billion is again explainable by the seven months'
difference in dates.
At the next bench-mark date, 1922, the cumulation wealth esti-
mate of $71.3 billion is about 10 per cent higher than Doane's esti-
mate of $65.0 billion,26 also based on assessment data. The dif-
ference appears to be, in large part at least, accounted for by valu-
ation.The movement of construction costs in the postwar period
was quite erratic, rising by about 29 per cent between 1919 and
1920 and dropping by about 25 per cent between 1920 and 1922.
Market prices of real estate, upon which Doane's estimate is based,
appear to have been more stable, though characterized by a fairly
rapid postwar rise.Itisin such periods of sharply fluctuating
price levels that the problem of differences in valuation becomes
most acute, leaving the investigator without a firm basis for in-
terpreting his results.
In 1930 comparison can be made with at least three separate
wealth estimates.The cumulated wealth estimate at the end of
1929 is $108.5 billion.Doane's 1930 estimate of $107.7 billion,
derived from assessment data, lies very close to the cumulated
total and is in no need of reconciliation.The %Vickens and Keller
estimates, both based on the April 1, 1930 Census of Population,
of $122.6 billion and $99.0 billion, respectively, diverge substan-
tially in opposite directions from the former and obviously require
explanation.
The $23.6 billion difference between Keller and SVickens can be
explained as follows:
1. The 1930 census returned the median value of owner-occupied
houses and the median rent of tenant-occupied dwelling units.
Keller accepted these medians as being equivalent to the mean
value and rent. on the other hand, was able to obtain
average value and rent through a special census tabulation.The
average value of an owner-occupied house in 1930, $5,833, was 21
per cent higher than the $4,828 median employed by Keller.Simi-
larly the average monthly rent of $30.34 was somewhat (8 per cent)
higher than median rent.These differences between average and
medianaccount for about two-thirds of the total difference between
Wickens and Keller.
26Kuznets' 1922 estimate, though in close agreement with the cumula-
tion estimate, was not used in this comparison since itis essentially
derived from and dependent upon the 1930 Census of Population data,
which are discussed later.
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2. Nearly all of the remaining difference is explained by Keller's
omission of 1.5 million vacant and nonreporting dwelling units from
his value total.
3. The remaining difference is caused by the slight difference in
gross rent multipliers used by these investigators in transferring
rent estimates of the tenant-occupied inventory into value estimates.
On the face of the evidence, Wickens' estimate appears to have
beenmademore, carefully than Keller's and therefore is preferable
for purposes of wealth checking. How can the $14.1 billion differ-
ence between the Wickens' and the cumulative totals be reconciled?
It is believed that was led into an overstatement of resi-
dential wealth because of (1) an actual error in the census reports
and (2) the use of an excessive gross rent multiplier in converting
average rent into average value.
There has been more than a little confusion in the interpretation
of 1930 census data on owner-occupied multifamily structures (con-
stituting, in 1940,16per cent of the owner-occupied inventory) as
to whether the values refer to the entire property or merely to the
dwelling unit in which the owner resides. The value of the former
will obviously be greater than the latter.While Wickens was led to
believe that dwelling unit rather than structure valites were reported
and based his wealth estimate on this assumption, internal evidence
in the census reports strongly indicates this cannot have been true.
In a special tabulation of 139 cities giving both the average value
for owner-occupied single-family houses and all owner-occupied
dwelling units, the value of the latter turns out to be, in the vast
majority of cases, larger than the former. This result is quite con-
trary to all available evidence found in FHA and 1940 census
data and even to common sense.It seems almost certain that the
"all owner-occupied" average was unduly enlarged because the
value of the entire structure was returned0If this be true, the over-
statement in Wickens' wealth estimate on this account is estimated
in the order of $6 billion.
The second source of error seems to be even more important. To
obtain a value figure for the tenant-occupied inventory, Wickens
multiplied average annual rent by a factor of 11.9.Independent
data on actual market relations between rent and value indicate
that this multiplier is substantially overstated. apparently
went astray by utilizing 1933 rent and value data drawn from his
Financial Survey of Urban Housing, a notably poor base year for
obtaining reliable value reports.While the contract rent reported
by tenants accurately reflected depression levels, the value reports
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oi owners, unwilling to concede the severe drop in real estate
values, did not; any ratio formed between these two figures was
bound to be too high.Judging from independent estimates of the
gross rent multiplier in 1929, a factor of 10 would appear to be
ample, further reducing Vdickens' wealth estimate by $9 billion. A
total reduction of $15 billion produces a 1930 wealth estimate
which is in good accord with the cumulation.
In 1938 Doane's estimate of $92.0 billion is about 5 per cent be-
low the cumulation estimate of $96.8 billion and does not warrant
extended discussion. More serious is the discrepancy between the
$99.2 billion cumulation estimate at the end of 1939 and the $87.4
billion estimate made by the Census Bureau for April 1, 1940.In
this case no significant part of the difference can be explained by
errors in reporting since the census was quite explicit in reporting
average values on a dwelling unit basis; nor does their choice of a
gross rent multiplier of 8.3 give any cause for suspicion in the
light of the independent findings for this year.Probably a large
part of the difference is accounted for by valuation.Judging from
both Wickens' experience and evidence for the late 1940's (pre-
later), thereis some tendency for owners' estimates of
market value to lag behind actual market prices; in 1940 these esti-
mates were probably still influenced by bitter depression experi-
ence.In addition there is some evidence that construction costs
had made a better recovery by 1940 than had market prices.It is
difficult to say, however, whether these observations are sufficient
to permit a full reconciliation between the two estimates.
In 1950 the cumulation falls considerably short of a rough wealth
estimate prepared from Census of Housing data—$212.5 billion
compared to $260.0 billion.
The problems of intersector shifts in wealth and general problems
of coverage are best illustrated in this decade. There was a move-
ment of an estimated 900,000 farmhouses into the nonfarm housing
inventory in the 1940's, resulting from actual change in use and
from a change in census definition. In addition by 1950 the housing
inventory included over 300,000 permanent and about 600,000 tem-
porary publicly financed dwelling units.Furthermore an estimated
1.75 million units were added by conversion; it is doubtful that the
estimates for additions and alterations fully reflect this enormous
gain.
The excess in the wealth total over the cumulation total is also
due in part to valuation. The construction cost index in 1949 (used
to revalue the cumulation) showed a 6 per cent decline from 1948
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levels, causing the first decrease in current dollar wealth since
1935.It is dubious whether owners' estimates of value were af-
fected by the interruption in the rise of market prices in 1949; it is
more likely that they were still reporting values at the higher 1948
level. The problem of dealing with owners' estimates can be illus-
trated by the following: at. the beginning of 1949 the Survey of Con-
surner Finances reported the value of an owner-occupied house, ac-
cording to owners' estimates, to be $9,100; according to the 1950
census sample the average value of an owner-occupied single-family
house was $10,800, or nearly 19 per cent higher.It is unlikely
that sampling errors alone could account for such a difference.
Market prices between the survey and census periods did not rise,
according to most observers.Nor could the additions to inventory
during the interim produce a rise in the average since the average
value of new units built was below the average in the standing in-
ventory. The presumption is strong that owners' estimates are not
completely reliable and are perhaps unduly influenced by the prices
prevailing two or more years in the past.
Comparison in Terms of Net Capital Formation
A re-examination of the wealth and cumulation totals at bench-
mark dates in terms of current dollar totals inclusive of land shows
a fair degree of correspondence in the light of formidable statistical
difference between them.This correspondence is deceptive, how-
ever. A 10 per cent difference at a bench-mark date might not seem
large enough to be worrisome.But because the increment to resi-
dential capital over a decade is a relatively small fraction of total
capital, small differences in stock estimates may result in large
differences in estimates of increments to stock and the test be-
comes too difficult to interpret. The wealth test is probably better
for twenty-, thirty-, or even fifty-year periods, but even here large
elements of uncertainty remain (see Table 1).
Before the check of the periodic increments to capital was under-
taken, two of the census estimates were adjusted (a $15 billion re-
duction in Wickens' estimate of 1930 and a $20 billion reduction in
the 1950 estimate) to allow for excess coverage.The land com-
ponent of all wealth estimates was removed, as stated earlier, by
means oi independently calculated, ratios of site to total value.
Between June 1890 and April 1950 the increase in value of resi-
dential structures implied in the wealth estimates amounts to $73.9
billion.Net capital formation, according to the estimate of this
study, totaled $62.0 billion to the end oi 1949 or about 16 per cent
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TABLE 15
Comparison of Net Nonfarm Residential Capital Formation Estimates
with Net Capital Formation Derived from Independent Wealth
Estimates for Various Subperiods, 1890—1950








Period (1) Period (2) (3)
6/1/90—12/31/00 13.1 6/1/90—6/1/00 9.3 3.8
12/31/00—12/31/12 14.7 6/1/00—6/1/12 18.3 —3.6
12/31/12—12/31/22 7.6 6/1/12—n.a./22 3.5 4.1
12/31/22—12/31/29 22.2 n.a./22—4/1/30 26.8 —4.6
12/31/29—12/31/39 —1.6 4/1/30—4/1/40 —10.4 8.8
12/31/39—12/31/49 5.9 4/1/40—4/1/50 26.4 — 20.5
6/1/90—12/31/22 35.4 6/1/90—n.a./22 311 4,3
6/1/90—12/31/29 57.6 6/1/90—4/1/30 57.9 —0.3
12/31/29—12/31/49 4.4 4/1/30—4/1/50 16.0 —11.6
6/1/90—12/31/49 62.0 6/1/90—4/1/50 73.9 —11.0
n.a. =notavailable.
less.The short fall for the six decades as a whole does not ap-
pear to be too great and to the extent that the wealth data have
some reliability for a sixty-year check, an error approaching this
size might have been caused by the unsatisfactory estimates of ad-
ditions and alterations.The check against wealth data is useful
to the extent that it is capable of revealing some systematic error
in net capital formation, that is if the discrepancies between capital
formation and wealth become wider and wider at each successive
bench-mark.This is not the case. The differences at bench-mark
dates, while sometimes large, are in opposite directions and do not
tend to cumulate.
Between 1890 and 1900 net capital formation of $13.1 billion ap-
pears to be some 40 per cent higher than implied by the wealth
totals.Between 1900 and 1912 the estimates deviate in the oppo-
site direction, $14.7 billion in the cumulation total compared with
$18.3 billion in the wealth estimates.In the next period, 1912—
1922, the net capital formation estimates are more than double the
amount of capital formation inferred from the wealth totals, $7.6
billion compared to $3.5 (and note that the comparison in terms of
current dollar wealth revealed less than a 10 per cent difference in
both 1912 and 1922).For the period 1890—1922 as a whole, the
years which the new construction expenditure series cover,total
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net capital formation of $35.4 billion is about 14 per cent higher
than the estimate of $31.]. billion based on bench-mark data0
In the period 1922—1930 the estimated $22.2 billion of net capital
formation falls about 17 per cent short of the wealth data. For the
four decades 1890'1930, because of offsetting subperiod discrepan-
cies, the agreement is quite close—the two sets of estimates dif-
fering by less than 1 per cent.
The wealth check fails most drastically in the next two decades.
While the wealth data between 1930 and 1940 imply $10.4 billion of
disinvestment, net capital formation is —$1.6 billion.In the next
decade the comparison yields equally poor results. Even after ad-
justment of the 1950 wealth estimate, a total of $26.4 billion is
implied by the census data compared to oniy $5.9 billion by the
estimate of this study.For both decades taken together, census
data imply $16.0 billion compared to $4.4 billion in the study.It is
obvious that differences as wide as these make a mockery of wealth
checks.While it is quite conceivable and even probable that the
estimates of net capital formation between 1940 and 1950 are under-
stated, it can hardly ever approach the shortage suggested by the
wealth totals, which incidentally are drawn from as good a source
as any wealth data currently in existence. The lesson to be drawn
is not merely the limitations provided by wealth checks but, more
importantly, that any investigator who lacks direct data for this
decade must proceed with Caution before he uses differences in
wealth as a measure of capital formation,
The Deflation Problem
Deflation of residential capital formation estimates to constant
dollar levels for most purposes requires in principle the use of a
priceindex of residential construction.However, rio national
market price index covering a reasonably long period of time exists
although house price indexes have been constructed for several
cities, usually covering relatively few years.Consequently, in
this paper as in other studies, a construction cost index is used as
a substitute on the usual assumption that the movement of such an
index is a reasonable reflection of changes in new house prices.
For various technical reasons, one might expect divergences to
arise between construction cost indexes as presently derived and a
valid index of the market price of homes.Further, although the
interconnection between markets for new and old homes undoubtedly
insures close conformity of their price movements at most times,
differences in price movements in these two markets could appear
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at several cycle stages and could persist for as long as several
years.
To determine the importance of such divergences between in-
dexes of construction cost and house prices, and thus to test the
validity of the deflator used in this paper, a house price index for
1890-1934 was developed and compared with the cost index used
here (Table
The data for the house price index were derived from the Finan-
cial Survey of Urban Housing, which presented the results of a
survey of financial and other information for a sample of residential
structures in sixty-one cities in 1934.Detailed information in the
survey is available only for twenty-two widely scattered cities.
One set of questions asked of each owner of a residential structure
related to (1) value of the property in 1934, (2) year of acquisition
by the then-present owner, and (3) original cost to owner at time of
acquisition.This information was summarized for each city and a
table presented for each of the twenty-two cities, listing the number
of properties included in the 1934 sample which were acquired in
each year from 1890 to 1933, the total acquisition cost of properties
acquired in each year, and the value of each group of such proper-
tiesin 1934.Separate data for all owner-occupied, all tenant-
occupied, all single-family owner-occupied, and all single-family
tenant-occupied structures were given.
The data selected for analysis were those relating to single.
family owner-occupied dwellings on the view that this relatively
homogeneous group, which comprises a major portion of the non-
farm housing stock, would show a more consistent pattern than the
other categories.Relatives for each year 1890—1933 were calcu-
lated for each city based on the ratio of the total acquisition cost
of the single-family owner-occupied houses acquired in each given
year to their value in 1934. The median relative for each year was
then determined27 and the relatives were chained and converted to a
1929 base (Table 16, column 1).It is assumed that the movement
of median relatives between successive years approximates the
movement in prices of a single sample between the two years.
It must be remembered that the price and value estimates on each
property relate to land and buildings combined.It has been neces-
sary to assume that land and structure values share proportionately
in any movement of the combined land-structure value.While this
"Individual city relatives based on less than four properties were dis-
regarded in the computation of the median.
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TABLE 16
Price Index of Single-Family Owner-Occupied Houses,






cent compound annual depreciation.
isnot a wholly satisfactoryassumption,it does permitone to
operate with data in their present form.
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Table 16, suggests general conformity between the two series.In
both there is an upward secular drift from 1890 to 1921, a more or
less stable level from 1922 to about 1929, and a sharp drop to 1933.
There ares however, several important differences between the
two series. Except for the period 1916—1922, the price index shows
considerably more short-run variability than the cost index.Be-
tween 1905 and 1909, for example, the price index had a rise of
more than 30 per cent and a fall of more than 10 per cent as com-
pared with the cost index, which rose less than 15 per cent between
1905 and 1907 and declined only 3 per cent between 1907 and 1908.
The same relationship holds for the period after 1922; the price in-
dex fell almost 8 per cent between 1925 and 1927 while the cost
index remained almost unchanged.Thus it seems likely that in
most period.s the market price of homes fluctuates more widely over
the short run than do construction Costs as measured by a standard
construction cost index.
A second difference between the two series is that the unadjusted
cost index rises to a much sharper peak in 1920 than does the price
index.This sharp rise in 1920, associated with a unique set of
transportation difficulties in the winter and spring of that year, is
found in all construction cost indexes and probably reflects a real
difference between construction costs and house prices.
The final and, for the purposes of this analysis, the most im-
portant divergence between the two series is the difference in long-
term rise over the entire period. The average level of the cost index
from 1921. to 1929 was almost 2.5 times the average level from 1895
to 1905.The unadjusted price index rose only about 70 per cent
betweenthe two periods.
Is this discrepancy an indication that there is a real divergence
between the long-term movement of standard construction cost in-
dexes and house prices, or is the discrepancy due to biases in the
price indeic? Although there are a number of possible biases in the
price series, only two appear serious enough to warrant adjustment
of the index: (1) value losses due to depreciation and obsolescence
and (2) value increments in the form of structural additions and
alterations.The price relative for 1904, for example, before con-
version to a 1929 base, measures the change in price of a given set
of properties between 1904 and 1934; this change is affected by
thirty years of depreciation operating on these properties and is
somewhat smaller than the change in price which would be measured
if this group of properties in 1934 had the same age structure that
they had in 1904. Conversely any structural additions or alterations
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to the property between 1904 and 1934 would tend to make the price
rise between these two years larger than the theoretically correct
price movement.
The level of depreciation rates on single-family houses as de-
termined in the market place was analyzed earlier.The FHA data,
from which the depreciation rate for the housing inventory used in
calculating net capital formation was derived, suggested that the
decline in value of single-family dwellings over the first fifty-two
years of life, after taking account of additions and alterations, ap-
proximated that resulting from a 1.2 per cent linear rate of depreci-
ation.Since the twenty-two-city index is based on movements in
the prices of structures plus land, the depreciation correction for
this index also requires a rate based on structures plus land. The
corresponding linear rate, derived from the same data, is about
1.0 per Cent.
For reasons described earlier, a curvilinear rate of depreciation
is more appropriate for residential structures than a linear rate.
The compound rate of depreciation, which yields about the same re-
maining value after fifty-two years as a 1.0 per cent linear rate,
but which approximates more closely the path of declining value of
residential structures as they age, is aboutper cent.Accord-
ingly; aper cent compound rate of depreciation was applied to
the original twenty-two-city index. The series so calculated, after
adjustment so that 1929 equals 100, is presented in Table 16,
column 2.
A comparison of the construction cost index with the adjusted
price index indicates that the correction for net depreciation has
approximately eliminated the discrepancy between the long-term
rises in the two series. The construction cost index in 1921—1929
was about 245 per cent of its level in 1895—1905; the adjusted
price index in 1921—1929 is about 238 per cent of its level in 1895—
1929.It would appear therefore that the long-run movement of the
construction cost index measures with reasonable accuracy the
long-run movement of house prices.
A Note on the of Savings in
Residential Real Estate
Other investigators have pointed out earlier that the cumulated
net savings (net investment) in the form of nonfarm residential real
estate since the 1890's have not been greatly in excess of the incre-
ment in the residential mortgage debt. This finding is confirmed by
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the data in ourstudy.Thus between 1890 and 1950 the increase in
the value of structures (in 1929 dollars and of depreciation) has
been about $62 billion while the increase in mortgage indebtedness
has been about $53 billion.
One could proceed to draw an inference from such statistical re-
suits that capital formation in residential structures was financed
not by the savings of owners of residential real estate but by the
savings of the mortgagee, in spite of the fact that (i) considerable
amounts of equity financing go into each year's new residential
construction, (2) net residential capital formation has been positive
in all but a few years, and (3) the aggregate debtto-value ratio has,
at all times, been substantially smaller than the aggregate equity-
to-value ratio.
Such an inference would definitely be misleading and tend to
underestimate significantly the role of equity finance in residential
real estate.The finding that residential real estate owners have
made only negligible savings is a direct result of the definition that
has sometimes been adopted for measuring savings in the form of
real estate.On the justification that the savings transaction (the
acquisition of residential structures) is so closely associated with
a dissavings transaction (the incurreiice of mortgage indebtedness),
the two transactions have been considered offsetting.Annual net
savings are treated as the difference between the year's net resi-
dential capital formation and the year's increment to the residential
mortgage debt.
But the annual increment to the mortgage debt is the result not
only of the financing 0f new construction during the year but also
of(1) the refinancing of debt on existing real estate facilities
(which have had a marked long-run price rise) and (2) the financing
of the acquisition oi the underlying sites of ioth new and existing
structures.Though neither the capital gains nor the value of land
are permitted to enter the savings column, both are implicitly entered
inthe dissavings column; no theoretically justifiable method or
statistical data exist for excluding from the increment in the mort-
gage debt the proportion due to land and capital gains.
While residential capital formation depends heavily upon external
financing in the form of mortgage loans, this kind of offsetting treat-
ment minimizes the role of individual savings by permitting indi-
viduals to dissave that which they have not been allowed to save
in the first place. One might better say that the "savings" of mort-
gagees financed not only true savings in residential real estate but
capital' gains and land values as well, thereby reducing somewhat
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the savings role of the creditor group and increasing that of real
estate owners.
If mortgage debt increments are treated as an offset to savings, a
difficult deflation problem is created, arising from the fact that one
form of savings (residential structures) is in the form of real re-
sources and the other form (mortgage debt) represents a paper claim.
The summation of annual net (after deduction of the increase in
debt) savings over a fifty-year period in. current dollars renders a
total that is difficult to interpret because of the differences in price
levels at which these savings were made.
For many purposes a deflated savings figure is required.While
it is possible to deflate savings in the form of residential structures
by a construction cost index to yield a meaningful total, the choice
of index becomes quite difficult if such savings have been reduced
by mortgage indebtedness.To deflate net residential savings by
the same index isto deflate, implicitly, mortgage debt by the
changes in construction costs.The deflation of a series which
represents a claim to a fixed number of dollars has always been a
difficult problem; it is not at all clear that a construction cost in-
dex is the most appropriate deflator. This is particularly true when
it is realized that the bulk of the mortgage debt is held by financial
intermediaries who do not themselves directly constitute a savings
group. The assets on the balance sheets of financial intermediaries
are imputed to the savings groups who hold claims against these in-
stitutions in the form of deposits, insurance reserves, saving and
loan shares, etc.Deflation of the mortgage holdings of financial
institutions by a construction cost index would imply an indirect
deflationof these claims by the same index, hardly a tenable
proposition.
It might be argued that the current dollar mortgage increment
could be deducted from a deflated series of annual netresidential
capital formation.But it is quickly seen that an aggregate of such
annual figures would be quite ambiguous since the size of the
aggregate would vary with every choice of base year. A similar de-
ficiency would result if one decided to deflate net investment and
mortgage debt by separate indexes, such as a construction cost in-
dex for the annual investment series and a cost of living index for
the mortgage debt.Again the aggregate sum would depend on the
relationship between the two indexes during the base year selected.
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